IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA WESTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs. No. CR08-4087

JESUS PALOMAREZ, TRANSCRIPT OF

SENTENCING

Defendant.

The Sentencing held before the Honorable Mark W. Bennett, Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, at the Federal Courthouse, 320 Sixth Street, Sioux City, Iowa, July 7, 2009, commencing at 3:02 p.m.

APPEARANCES

For the Plaintiff: JOHN H. LAMMERS, ESQ.

Assistant United States Attorney

Terra Centre - Suite 670

600 Fourth Street Sioux City, IA 51101

For the Defendant: ROBERT A. WICHSER, ESQ.

Assistant Federal Defender

Suite 400

701 Pierce Street Sioux City, IA 51101

Also present: Shane Moore, U.S. Probation

Reported by: Shelly Semmler, RMR, CRR

320 Sixth Street

Sioux City, IA 51101

(712) 233-3846

THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated. Good afternoon. This is United States versus Jesus Palomarez, Criminal Number 08-4087. The defendant's personally present represented by Robert Wichser. And the U.S. Attorney's Office is represented by Assistant U.S. Attorney Jack Lammers. And we're here for sentencing.

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Mr. Wichser, have you had a full, fair, and complete opportunity to review the presentence report with your client?

MR. WICHSER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And United States Probation Office scored this as a -- Count 1, total offense level 31, criminal history category 6. Count 2 is a 60-month consecutive sentence. And because of the application of the career criminal guideline, the guideline range is 262 to 327 months, but that includes the 60-month consecutive sentence on Count 1. So if I were to give a guideline sentence, the lowest guideline sentence I could give would be 202 months on Count 1 and 60 months on Count 2. And the Count 2 60-month sentence would be consecutive to the 202 months on Count 1. Short of a departure or variance, that would be the lowest guideline sentence that I could give.

MR. WICHSER: Yes, if you accept the scoring of the career offender, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, my understanding is you haven't objected to the career offender. You've objected to the fact that the criminal history scoring of 31 substantially

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    underrepresents -- I'm sorry, substantially overrepresents the
    defendant's criminal history, and then you want me to do a
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    variance based on the Spears/Kimbrough type of analysis that
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    because there allegedly is no empirical evidence supporting the
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    career criminal guideline that I don't have to give it as much
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    weight.
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              MR. WICHSER:
                             Correct.
              THE COURT: Or I can give it whatever weight I want.
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                            That's absolutely the argument in a
              MR. WICHSER:
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    nutshell, yes, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
                                 Mr. Lammers, do you agree with
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    those guideline calculations?
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              MR. LAMMERS: Yes.
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              THE COURT: Okay. And are we actually going to take
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    testimony from Mr. Rogers?
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              MR. WICHSER: Yes, Your Honor. That will be by
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    telephone with the consent of the parties, and that testimony is
    directed to the variance issue.
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19
                                 And it's -- his report isn't good
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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             Is he going to testify beyond the scope of the report?
    enough?
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              MR. WICHSER: No, he's not, Your Honor.
                                                        He's not
22
    going to testify beyond the scope of the report.
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              THE COURT:
                          Well, I mean, I'll be glad to take his
24
    testimony.
                I've been listening to duplicative testimony all day
25
    in a civil case, so there's nothing new. But I've read his
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    report. I'm totally familiar with Dr. Rogers. You want to call
    him as a witness, I'll be glad to do it telephonically.
 2.
              MR. WICHSER: Well, if I could have a moment to confer
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    with my client, that may obviate --
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               THE COURT:
                           Well, let me see. Do you have a need to
 6
    cross-examine him?
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               MR. LAMMERS:
                             No.
                                  So you can call him if you want to.
               THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              MR. WICHSER: May I have one moment, Judge?
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               THE COURT:
                           Sure.
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                                     I should have responded no, Your
              MR. LAMMERS:
                             Sorry.
    Honor, not simply no.
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13
               THE COURT:
                           That's okay.
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              MR. LAMMERS: Well . . .
                          I didn't even pick up on it.
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               THE COURT:
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              MR. WICHSER: Your Honor, with the consent of my
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    client, we don't need to call Dr. Rogers.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay. Nick, would you make sure -- or,
    Michelle, you want to run in and tell Jennifer to call him to
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2.0
    let him know he's not going to be called as a witness?
    don't know if she has his number or not, so maybe -- let's see.
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22
                           We do, Your Honor.
               THE CLERK:
23
               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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               MR. WICHSER: Your Honor, out of an abundance of
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    caution since Dr. Rogers is not going to testify, I'm going to
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offer at this time Defendant's Exhibits A through D into
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 2
               They've been previously marked.
    evidence.
 3
               (Defendant Exhibits A through D were offered.)
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               THE COURT: Any objection?
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               MR. LAMMERS: No, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: A through D are received.
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               (Defendant Exhibits A through D were admitted.)
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               THE COURT: And D -- is D his curriculum vita?
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              MR. WICHSER: Yes.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Good. Which I'm totally familiar
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    with.
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                      Why don't we hear argument first on your
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    departure issue because you have a departure issue that the
18
    criminal history --
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              MR. WICHSER:
                             Yes.
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               THE COURT: -- scoring of 31 substantially -- it's
    even hard for me to say it with a straight face -- substantially
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    overrepresents the defendant's criminal history.
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              MR. WICHSER: Your Honor, as I pointed out in my brief
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    on the issue, it's imperative that the Court examine the
    historical significance of this defendant's criminal history
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vis-a-vis when it occurred, what the nature of the offenses were. Most of his criminal history is derived from problems that originated in the juvenile justice system. And basically they're a product of lack of strong upbringing and father figure. If you look at the actual offenses, even without a career offender enhancement, he's still in a category 6.

THE COURT: And he has nine different convictions that

MR. WICHSER: (Nodded head.)

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aren't counted.

THE COURT: I do take you up on your invitation to look at criminal history carefully. I did that. And I counted -- including some charges where there are multiple counts that he was convicted of, he's got 9 separate convictions that actually were never counted in the 31 which is pretty amazing considering his relatively young age. I mean, to be at a criminal history scoring of 31 and then have 9 more convictions that actually didn't count, that's staggering.

MR. WICHSER: And a lot of the points come from problems with driving without a license, driving under a suspended license, that type of offense. There's very, very little personal violence in his background. The two big convictions that count for the career offender occurred when he was very young and involved a breaking into the store room of a bar to steal beer, and the other was with an acquaintance breaking into another acquaintance's apartment. But there was

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    no personal violence involved in any of his criminal history
 2.
    with the exception of some dismissed domestic problems.
              THE COURT:
                          Well, that's not true.
 3
                                                   He's got a
    conviction in paragraph 39 for assault. He has a conviction in
 4
 5
    paragraph 50 for assault, and he has a conviction in paragraph
 6
    51 for assault. So to say that he has no criminal history of
    violence is just simply dead wrong.
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                             These are in the nature, Your Honor, of
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              MR. WICHSER:
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    youthful fights. That's basically what occurred.
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              THE COURT:
                         So there's a youthful fight exception to
    violence.
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              MR. WICHSER: No, no. That's just the explanation for
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    the activity.
                         Well, it's just -- it's almost beyond my
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              THE COURT:
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    ability to grasp your argument that somebody with 31 criminal
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    history points can be substantially overrepresented in a
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    criminal history category 6. I'm just having a very hard time
    grasping that.
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                            Overall, Judge, the thrust of the
              MR. WICHSER:
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    argument is in this particular case there was very small
    quantity of drugs involved in the case, but yet the punishment
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    is basically very, very severe.
23
                          Well, it is very, very severe because he's
               THE COURT:
24
    a career offender. But that's really a different issue than --
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              MR. WICHSER:
                             Overstatement.
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-- than -- overstatement of criminal
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               THE COURT:
    history is a discrete issue.
                                   It has nothing to do with the
 2.
    offense of conviction, the facts of the offense of conviction.
 3
    It's just like -- I mean, it would take a Houdini to convince me
 4
    that 31 is really -- 31 is really 11 or is it 10 to get down to
 5
    a criminal history -- to go down one criminal history. Yeah, 12
 6
              Really what your argument is is 31 is really 12.
 7
    That's your argument; right?
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                                   I'm asking the Court to go down.
              MR. WICHSER: Yes.
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              THE COURT: Well, that is awfully fuzzy math that 31
                      I -- I mean, he's got a little bit of
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    can become a 12.
    everything. He's got the burglaries, has the assault, prior
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    drug conviction and not off to a very good start.
                                                        In the very
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14
    first paragraph under his criminal history -- well, setting
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    aside paragraph 32 but just take paragraph 33, he has his
    probation revoked, goes to prison, gets out on parole, then has
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    the parole revoked. That's about as bad of a start as I've ever
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    seen. Matter of fact, I'm not sure I've seen anybody who on
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    their first conviction had both probation and parole revoked.
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    And that's just the opening salvo, and it doesn't really get any
2.1
    better.
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               I mean, I realize, yeah, he's got consumption,
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    intoxication, underage possession, but he doesn't get any
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    criminal history points for those. And then you go to the
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    serious assault and then -- you know, I missed -- he's got a
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willful injury conviction in paragraph 56. So to say he doesn't have -- I guess you want to just call it teenage fighting. He's got a demonstrated history and record of assaultive behavior.

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Mr. Lammers, why don't you enlighten me. What am I missing here?

MR. LAMMERS: Nothing. I intended to point out exactly what the Court just referred to in paragraph 56, for example.

I guess charitably, I understood Mr. Wichser's argument to be that most of his points came or a lot of his points or a significant number of his points came from driving and related charges, but I don't frankly think that matters when he has enough points based on his assaultive conduct, based on the fact that he was out of prison less than three weeks -- I mean, let's -- let's put that in context. He gets discharged from his willful injury -- first of all, he gets paroled. This is in paragraph 56. He gets paroled in 2007. His parole's revoked in June of 2008 which means he goes back to prison. He gets out October 28 of 2008, and November 13 of 2008, less than 3 weeks after he gets released, he's got 2 ounces of methamphetamine and a pistol in his pocket.

There's nothing underrepresented in this man's criminal history. If you take a look at his criminal history, from the time he was 13, he has been arrested every single year with the exception of 2000 and 1995. Those are the only two

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years he doesn't have a separate arrest and multiple arrests in most of those years. And as the Court noted, he continually gets his parole revoked, his probation revoked.

If you'd look at -- as I guess sort of term them the less serious offenses where he got jail time, he gets his parole revoked and he gets sent to jail. And I'm referring specifically to paragraph 48, possession of a controlled substance. It's not a parole. He got 128 days in jail, 90 days suspended. Later in 2004 his probation was revoked and he got 90 days imposed. He doesn't stay clean or follow the rules on any of the charges that he's gotten.

So I don't think the Court's missing anything here. I don't think his criminal history is underrepresented at all, and it certainly isn't substantially -- or excuse me, overrepresented at all, and it certainly isn't substantially overrepresented. It paints a very clear picture of exactly the type of criminal conduct that he's engaged in since he was 13 years old.

THE COURT: If anything, it's substantially underrepresented.

MR. LAMMERS: Right.

THE COURT: I mean, you look at -- I already focused on his first adult conviction. But then you look at the number of times he's had probation revoked: Paragraph 29, probation revoked; paragraph 51, probation revoked; paragraph 53,

probation revoked; paragraph 56, parole revoked.

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Well, Mr. Wichser, anything else you want to add on your departure issue?

MR. WICHSER: No, Your Honor. I felt obligated to make the argument and duty bound to do so, and I did.

THE COURT: And that's fine. There's this commercial on the radio for refinancing mortgages, and the tag line is it's the biggest no brainer in the history of earth. This ruling is the easiest no brainer in the history of earth from my way of thinking. I mean, I just -- like I said, I can't even fathom the argument that 31 points is really 12 points given the recidivist nature of the defendant's conduct.

As Mr. Lammers pointed out, there are only two years in his adult life where he didn't actually commit a crime. He commits crimes repeatedly, has his probation and parole revoked repeatedly, has no ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and is -- I mean, I know it's a little trite, but if you looked up recidivism in the dictionary, his picture would be next to it. He's just -- he's as big a recidivist for somebody his age as I've ever seen. So I'm not going to grant your motion for a departure.

Now, your variance motion is a little bit more intriguing but runs into some of the same problems. You have to actually look at the facts of this case. In the abstract, I tend to agree with your variance argument. But when you

actually apply it to the facts of this case, it doesn't seem like it's the most appropriate case to raise the argument in, but I understand you have a duty to raise it. So why don't we hear your argument on the downward variance.

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MR. WICHSER: Well, Your Honor, that argument proceeds from a Kimbrough/Spears type of analysis because as the Court said when it entered the courtroom, the thrust of the argument is that because this career offender is not based upon empirical data, I submit that the Court is -- doesn't need to give it much deference because it's subject to the same analysis as the Court made with the crack/powder disparity and also what the Court -- the arguments that the Court made in deconstructing the child pornography guidelines. It's basically the same thing.

This is -- this career offender is based basically upon the commission's own interpretation of the statute, and it's not really based upon any studies of recidivism or age related to the crimes committed or that sort of thing. And because of that, it's just not entitled to that type of deference, and the Court could vary downward on that reason alone with a policy disagreement with the career offender guideline as well as taking into consideration all of the problems that were pointed out with this defendant in Dr. Rogers' report which is an exhibit in this case.

He suffers from chronic depression based primarily on lack of youthful guidance which under the guidelines was a

disfavored motion for a departure. But as a variance I think the Court can consider it.

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Also he suffers from personality disorder which is, of course, not typical. He is able to be rehabilitated in the eyes of Dr. Rogers. He needs vocational training. He also needs extensive group and individual therapy, and for that reason I'm going to ask the Court in the end to consider a recommendation for a medical facility that would attend to Mr. Palomarez' treatment.

And for all of the other reasons that I have outlined in my written motion, I would ask the Court to consider a sentence below the calculated advisory guideline range.

THE COURT: Well, don't you actually have two kind of distinct variance arguments? Your one argument is that I should not give the career criminal guideline as much weight as the sentencing commission does or not give it any weight.

And then really unrelated to that, it seems to me, is the 3553(a) factors, particularly the defendant's personal background and family history, lack of parental guidance and role models in the home and that type of thing.

MR. WICHSER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah. Mr. Lammers?

MR. LAMMERS: You can consider -- there's nothing mandatory about the career offender guideline. There's nothing mandatory about any of the guidelines anymore, and you can vary

from the guideline, the career offender guideline as well. I fully understand that.

THE COURT: The rationale of Spears and Kimbrough would apply.

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MR. LAMMERS: Well, I don't know that Kimbrough applies. I don't know if Spears changes that. And I'm referring -- there's a case out of the Seventh Circuit that says a sentence entered under the career offender guidelines 4B1.1 raises no Kimbrough problem because to the extent it treats crack cocaine differently from powder cocaine, the disparity arises from a statute, not from the advisory guidelines.

I don't know if Spears modified that when Spears was decided or not. It may have. I don't know. There's some language in Spears that may potentially support, and there's some language in Spears that goes the other way. So I don't know that we've got a Kimbrough problem.

But the case also says very specifically we don't mean to imply that this guideline is any more mandatory or any less advisory than any other guideline, and it says specifically that the Court can vary from that advisory guideline. I think you can.

I don't know that necessarily this is the same as the crack/powder disparity or it's the same as the child pornography analysis based on the fact that this involves more of an interplay of the statutory guidance of the career offender than

I think maybe those others do since they're more sentencing commission constructs than this is. So I don't know that that analysis is exactly the same.

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I don't think it matters for our purposes today because I think the Court recognizes that you can vary either way, whether you're varying because you say I want to vary solely on a policy guideline or you say I want to vary because they're advisory only and I think a more reasonable sentence is different. So I don't think that particular analysis really matters much here. And I would submit on the facts of this particular case it really doesn't matter at all.

I can envision a situation where a court might look at someone who's a career offender who has 2 prior burglary convictions who's a criminal history category 2 or a criminal history category 3 but because of these 2 prior burglary convictions when he was a juvenile or just out of his juvenile years that makes him a career offender and at that point you might say, well, I have more of a policy disagreement in this type of case.

That has no application in my view to this particular defendant and the facts of this particular defendant's case.

THE COURT: Because he has 31 criminal history points.

MR. LAMMERS: Because he has 31 criminal history points. I think they were modified actually total to 28 because some of them were counted pursuant to -- they were 1-point

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    scoring and you can only count 4 of them, so I think he
    actually -- the final score of his criminal history pursuant to
 2.
    the presentence report I think is 28.
                                            They started at 31 and
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 4
    then said you can only count 4 points of that.
5
    referring now to -- excuse me. I lost my paragraph.
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              THE COURT:
                           62.
                               No.
                                     I think you're looking at
7
    paragraph 59, but then if you look at 60 and 61, it goes back up
    to a 31.
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9
                             That's right.
              MR. LAMMERS:
                                            I'm sorry.
                                                        I was looking
    at -- I was looking at 59.
10
                                  59 drops it to a 28, but then 60
11
              THE COURT: Right.
12
    and 61 -- 60, you have 2 points added because he was on parole
13
    and 61 an additional point because it's less than 2 years
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    following the defendant's release from custody, so you're back
15
    to a 31, so he actually does have a legitimate 31.
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              MR. LAMMERS: You're absolutely right. And I quess
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    that's an even stronger argument is 3 of the scored points
    didn't actually score on top of the 9 unscored convictions that
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19
                   And that's not even referring to -- and I'm not
    didn't score.
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    asking the Court to use as part of its calculation all the
    dismissed conduct, all the time where the police were called and
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    for whatever reason charges weren't pursued.
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              I just don't see a variance being appropriate based on
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    either the 3553(a) factors here. And I understand that there is
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potentially some support for the fact that, you know, he's got

some troubled upbringing and some difficult time with his mental health history.

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But if you'd look at Dr. Rogers' report, he says

that -- and this is on page 4 -- the profile indicated he's not

particularly impulsive or unable to control himself. And then

it goes on to say he's not experiencing any thought disorder.

And I'm referring now, Your Honor, to the fifth paragraph. But

he feels persecuted, downtrodden and depressed.

I don't know that that really provides a lot of support to -- it's not like he has some sort of disease or defect where he can't control his behavior. I think actually Dr. Rogers says just the opposite. He is able to control his impulses. Does that mean he chooses not to? That would be one fair reading.

Now, obviously Dr. Rogers says he's got -- I think he says antisocial personality disorder. He says he didn't specifically find it, but it's hard not to conclude that based on his actions and his criminal history. I'm not disputing that he's got some mental health issues.

But I don't know that that outweighs in any sense his continuous, ongoing, repeated criminal behavior from the time he's 13 years old. Just look at the 13-year-old offense, and that didn't score either, and I don't ask the Court obviously to score it. But he goes to Eldora. He's on the run from Eldora, commits additional crime when he's on the run from Eldora. Then

he gets arrested at 17 prior to his 18th birthday, so they had to waive him up from juvenile court or because of the prior placement in Eldora. And there's kind of a tricky provision in the Iowa Code where if somebody's been placed -- has had out-of-home placement or been actually placed at Eldora that certain types of crimes are automatically started in the adult court after you turn 16. That may be one of them. I don't know specifically.

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But either way, at 17 years old, he finds himself in adult court. He ends up going to prison at 18 years old. That doesn't happen very often in the state of Iowa if you're not committing a class B felony or some sort of mandatory minimum offense or violent offense.

But he earned his way into prison because he wouldn't do what he was told. He had his probation revoked, and he ended up going to prison. And then he gets out, and he keeps committing crime after crime after crime after crime.

I simply don't see how 3553(a), when you consider the serious nature of his offense, when you consider the need to impose a punishment, especially when you consider the need to protect the community from further crimes of this man, I don't see how his mental health issues outweigh any of those other factors.

And I think it's especially important to focus on the fact that three weeks after he's discharged from prison he's

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    armed himself and he's involved in drug dealing. That is
    significant.
 2.
               So based on those factors, I simply don't see a reason
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    to vary in this particular case. I'm open to the possibility
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5
    that there are cases where a person would be a career offender
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    that a variance would certainly seem to be more warranted.
                                                                  Ι
7
    simply don't see it here.
              THE COURT: Mr. Wichser?
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9
              MR. WICHSER: Your Honor, I would just like to clarify
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    because there's been on this record some confusion between why
    Mr. Palomarez is considered a career offender. It's not because
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12
    he has 31 criminal history points.
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              THE COURT: No, I understand that.
14
              MR. WICHSER: Okay.
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              THE COURT:
                          It's --
16
              MR. WICHSER: It's because of the two burglary
    convictions makes him a career offender.
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18
              THE COURT: That's true.
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              MR. WICHSER:
                             Okay.
2.0
              THE COURT: There's no question about that.
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              MR. WICHSER:
                             Because when I was sitting here
22
    listening to the arguments, there seemed to be -- the career
23
    offender appeared to be driven by the 31 criminal history
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    points, and that's totally erroneous.
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               THE COURT:
                           That is erroneous because there's a very
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    specific way you become a career offender under the guidelines,
    and I understand that. But on the question of relief from that
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    quideline range, I'm free to consider the fact that he has 31
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 4
    criminal history points.
 5
              MR. WICHSER: Yes, yes.
                                        I would agree with that.
 6
              THE COURT:
                          But that has nothing to do with why he's a
 7
    career offender.
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              MR. WICHSER:
                            No.
 9
              THE COURT: You have to have the two predicate
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    felonies, either a crime of violence or a drug crime.
11
              MR. WICHSER: Yes.
              THE COURT: You think they might also make it a career
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13
    offender for somebody with 30 criminal history points, but they
    chose not to do it. But no. I understand your argument.
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15
              Anything else you'd like to add?
16
                                  Thank you, Your Honor.
              MR. WICHSER:
                            No.
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              THE COURT: Mr. Palomarez, you have the right to say
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    anything to me you want to before I impose sentence.
                                                           You don't
19
    have to say anything. You have a right to remain silent.
2.0
    you exercise your right to remain silent, I will not hold it
    against you in any way. But if you'd like to say something, I'd
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    be happy to hear from you. Is there anything you'd like to say?
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              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                         Okay. Can you move that microphone a
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little closer? You can remain seated if you like.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Thank you. In the last eight months I've been incarcerated, I've had a lot of time to reflect on my past, present, and future. I feel bad that I hurt a lot of people, and I'm sorry that so many people have to take time out of their lives to focus on my wrongdoing.

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I have made the most out of these eight months. I have put myself in the shoes of every possible person I have affected from minimal to extreme. There's nothing positive about my actions, and I know I have to make a lot of changes in my life. I have written many facts about my life in my letter of allocution to you, Your Honor, and it all boils down to me growing up without guidance in my pattern of life that has hurt everyone around me including me.

I wish that someone in school or juvenile placement would have attempted to evaluate what was psychologically affecting me. Instead, punishment after punishment to scare me straight, to learn my lesson.

I've never enjoyed being locked up because I am -- I never enjoyed being locked up. I want to change. I accept that I made this choice. I acknowledge I broke the law, Your Honor. I saw I could make quick money and maybe catch up on a lot of time lost. I know I wasn't cut out to be selling drugs. I'm just not that smart and definitely not that lucky. I accept punishment for my actions. It is well deserved, but I ask for leniency because I am truly very sorry.

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               I had never truly been psychologically evaluated till
    I saw Dr. Rogers. And I know that if I receive the help that
 2
    Dr. Rogers recommends I can be productive in society and in the
 3
 4
    life of my son and many others I will reach for.
 5
    Your Honor.
 6
               THE COURT:
                           Thank you.
 7
              Mr. Lammers, anything else you'd like to add?
               MR. LAMMERS: No.
                                  Thank you, Your Honor.
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 9
               THE COURT: Mr. Wichser, anything else you'd like to
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    add?
11
              MR. WICHSER:
                             No, Your Honor.
12
                          Okay. I'm going to take a short recess,
               THE COURT:
    meet with probation, and then come back and pronounce sentence.
13
14
    Thank you.
15
               (Recess at 3:36 p.m.)
16
               THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated.
17
              Mr. Lammers, anything else you'd like to add?
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              MR. LAMMERS: No thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Mr. Wichser?
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              MR. WICHSER: No, Your Honor.
                                  In this case I find on Count 1 and
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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    Count 2 based on the interaction of the career criminal
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    quideline there's a United States Sentencing Guideline range of
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    262 to 327 months. Count 2 is a 60-month consecutive sentence.
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               I have to rule on the defendant's motion for downward
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variance. I also have an independent obligation to review the Title 18, 3553(a) factors to determine whether a variance is appropriate.

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And I think there are -- the mitigating factor that I see would be the defendant's childhood and upbringing and lack of role models and parental supervision. And that's frequently a factor that I use to vary downward from a guideline range to impose a sentence that is less severe than the guidelines impose.

But I also have an obligation to look at all of the Title 18, 3553(a) factors. And in looking at the history and characteristics of the defendant, while the family circumstances is a mitigating factor -- I think I might have said aggravating, but I meant mitigating. It's a mitigating factor, and I think it's substantially mitigating.

But there -- the history and characteristics of the defendant are substantially aggravating in the sense that not only is he a career offender by virtue of the two paragraphs identified in the presentence report, but there was a third paragraph that would have qualified for the career offender, and probation didn't need to use that because they had the two burglaries. But the willful injury paragraph would have qualified. So, I mean, he's a career offender to me by any definition.

And it's just that he's committed a staggering amount

of crime for 28 years old. And if you take out the periods of time you've been in jail or prison, you've committed I think more crime in a shorter period of time than any defendant I've sentenced in 15 years which would be over 2,500 defendants. And I just can't overlook that.

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And not only have you committed all of those crimes, but when you do get a chance to be on probation or parole, more often than not you violate your probation and your parole.

And while I appreciate the fact that you said in your allocution you've had time to think about things the last eight months, you've had a lot of other opportunities to think about things. And your response has always been as soon as you get out to commit another crime which was what happened in this case.

And I also think 3553(a)(2), the need for the sentence imposed, you are one of the rare individuals that I sentence where the public actually needs protection from you. Most of the people I sentence are not apt to go out and commit other crimes. But the best indication of whether you're going to commit future crimes is your past. And that's really all you've done.

And so I do feel a need to protect the public from further crimes. And it's not just that you have 31 criminal history points, but you have the whole package. I mean, you have a drug offense. You have a weapons offense. You have

assaultive behavior multiple times. And so the public does need protection from that.

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And so when I balance all of the 3553(a) factors, I'm not going to grant a variance in this case, at least a downward variance. I think I'd be well within my discretion to go above the 327 months, but I'm not going to do that. I'm not even going to sentence you at the high end of the guideline range. I'm going to sentence you -- because ultimately I do try and give people the benefit of the doubt, even people who have multiple convictions. So I'm going to sentence you to 202 months on Count 1 and 60 months consecutive on Count 2 for a total punishment of 262 months which is the low end of your guideline range.

I recognize that I have discretion to vary from the guideline range, but in this case I do not believe it would be appropriate to exercise that discretion downward. So I have not done so.

So my guideline calculations are total offense level 31, criminal history category 6, and that's an advisory guideline range of 188 to 235 months. However, the guideline range established by the career criminal guideline 4B1.1(c)(3) results in a greater guideline range, and that's how I got to the 262 to 327 months.

I am going to recommend the 500-hour comprehensive residential drug treatment program.

And is there a facility you'd like me to recommend,

Mr. Wichser?

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MR. WICHSER: Yes, Your Honor. The defendant would respectfully request placement at the federal medical facility in Rochester or, in the alternative, Oxford, Wisconsin.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to recommend Oxford,
Wisconsin, to the Bureau of Prisons or another facility as close
to his residence as possible consistent with his custody and
security classification.

Upon release from imprisonment, you'll be on supervised release for 4 years on Count 1 and 3 years on Count 2 to run concurrently.

While you're on supervised release, you can't violate any state, local, or federal law. You can't possess a firearm, ammunition, or other destructive device. You'll cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample.

You can't violate any state, local, or federal law.

You'll never be allowed to possess a firearm or ammunition

unless you petition the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,

and Explosives to have your rights restored.

You'll have the standard conditions of supervised release and the following special conditions: You'll successfully complete a program of testing and treatment for substance abuse as directed by your probation officer.

You're prohibited from using alcohol and going to

bars, taverns, and other establishments whose primary source of income is derived from the sale of alcohol.

You cannot knowingly associate with any member of a gang while you're on supervised release.

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You'll also participate in mental health treatment and evaluation as recommended by your probation officer. And you're subject to the standard search condition.

You don't have ability to pay a fine, so the fine is waived. There's a special assessment of \$200 due and owing.

You are remanded to the custody of the United States marshal to serve this sentence.

You have a right to appeal the sentence that I've imposed. If you decide to appeal, you need to file a written notice of appeal with the clerk of our court within ten days from the date I sign your judgment. If you can't afford to pay for a lawyer or pay the costs of an appeal, those costs will be paid on your behalf.

Mr. Palomarez, this was a very difficult sentence for me to impose. I did give it a lot of consideration. But in the end I think you have to be accountable for your own conduct.

And that's what kind of persuaded me.

It's hard for me not to give somebody a break. I've given more breaks than probably any federal district court judge in the country in sentencing. And you had a very, very nice allocution, and you're very well spoken, and you sound like a

very intelligent young man to me. And so it was very hard for me to give this sentence. But I have to balance society's interests too, and I tried to do that to the best of my ability.

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So good luck to you. I hope the time passes as quickly for you as you can. And I hope you can take advantage of some of the opportunities which are somewhat limited in the Bureau of Prisons.

And you do have a lot of family support, and that's a very wonderful thing. I already said I've sentenced over 2,500 people to federal prison. And in my first year back in 1994, I was sentencing a woman from Sioux City. And when I read her presentence report, I noticed that she had ten brothers and sisters and they all lived in the area. And her parents were still alive.

And I came out to sentence her in this courtroom. And there wasn't a single person in the back. She had five prior convictions, and the family had given up on her. Your family hasn't given up on you, and that's a good thing. They shouldn't give up on you because you're family and you're loved by them, and you have potential. And so I just hope you can maximize that potential and make the most of things. And good luck to you.

Is there anything -- oh, and I'll ask the U.S. marshals, Chad, if you can accommodate a family visitation.

MR. WICHSER: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Mr. Wichser, is there anything further?

2 MR. WICHSER: No, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Mr. Lammers, is there anything further?

MR. LAMMERS: There's something I don't think we addressed, and I should have brought it up earlier. We're not making a substantial assistance motion in this case. I think we went right into the variance. I think pursuant to our plea agreement that I am -- that I should tell the Court, whether we make the motion or don't make the motion, the nature of the defendant's assistance. I can briefly do that.

THE COURT: Is there any chance of a Rule 35(b) motion?

MR. LAMMERS: Well, there is a potential for a Rule 35(b) motion. I told Mr. Wichser that. The defendant gave us information on one specific target who I am interested in. We have some things to clarify with the defendant potentially before we're able to use him. But there is a potential.

But his -- the nature of his assistance is -- again, I think I'm required by the plea agreement to identify that to the district court -- is that he gave a post-Miranda statement and then a proffer interview. We didn't use his information in -- we didn't use him in grand jury. He didn't support any search warrants. He didn't do any active work. We simply haven't been able to use his information at this point, but I think that I needed to make that of record. So I'm sorry I didn't bring it

up earlier.

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THE COURT: Okay. And if you had told me that before, it wouldn't have affected my sentencing decision. But I think it would be appropriate to tell Mr. Palomarez about the possibility of a Rule 35(b) motion and what can happen.

MR. LAMMERS: I agree.

THE COURT: Okay. This is actually good news for you. There wasn't much good news this afternoon for you, but here's a little piece that should make your entire family and you somewhat hopeful.

There's an opportunity based on the information that you provided that the government may seek to charge somebody. And if you continue to provide substantial assistance, for example, maybe testifying in front of the grand jury, they would bring you back from prison to do that or they could -- the U.S. Attorney's Office could if they wanted to, maybe testify at the person's detention hearing, trial, sentencing.

If you were to continue to provide substantial assistance, the U.S. Attorney's Office could make what we call a Rule 35(b) substantial assistance motion. And that means that you would come back before me for sentencing. We usually do it by telephone, so you wouldn't necessarily be in person. But then I'd have an opportunity to reduce your sentence based on any substantial assistance that you provided to the government.

And nothing I've said today would preclude me from

reducing your sentence if you provided substantial assistance. It's like apples and oranges. We had the apples today. The oranges would be a substantial assistance motion. And I wouldn't hold it against you in any way that you had 31 criminal history points or any of the other factors that I used when I decided not to reduce your sentence today. I would look at a new set of factors. It's basically the timeliness of your assistance; whether it's truthful, complete, and reliable; how useful it was to the government; how useful I found the substantial assistance to be.

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And of all of those factors, the number-one thing is whether I think you've been a hundred percent truthful in cooperating against another individual. If I find you've been a hundred percent truthful and the U.S. Attorney's Office makes the Rule 35(b) motion, then I can't think of any reason why I wouldn't reduce your sentence.

But if I find that you aren't being a hundred percent truthful, two things are most likely to happen. One, I wouldn't reduce your sentence at all, and I have the discretion to do it, and I've done that on occasion where I didn't find people's cooperation to be truthful. Or two, I would reduce it but not very much if I didn't think you were a hundred percent truthful. And the burden's on you to convince me that you've been a hundred percent truthful in your cooperation.

So that's really your only hope of getting your

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    sentence reduced. And Mr. Wichser can't make that Rule 35
    motion on your behalf. I can't make it on your behalf. Only
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    the U.S. Attorney's Office can make that on your behalf.
              But like I said, if they do make that motion on your
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    behalf and you're a hundred percent truthful, there's no reason
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    I know of -- there are no guarantees or promises, but there's no
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    reason I know of as I sit here today why I wouldn't reduce your
               And, you know, I've given reductions as low as 5
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    percent up to 65 or 70 percent depending upon my analysis of
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    those 5 factors.
              And so, you know, if they do make the motion, then
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    there will be an opportunity to reduce your sentence.
    you're truthful, I wouldn't have any hesitation in reducing your
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    sentence. Do you understand that?
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              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
                                  I hope I have the opportunity to
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    have you back in front of me and reduce your sentence.
                                                             I would
    like to have that opportunity.
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              THE DEFENDANT:
                              Me too, Your Honor.
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                          Okay. And I'm sure you'd like me to have
              THE COURT:
    that opportunity, and I know your family would too.
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              Mr. Wichser, is there anything further?
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              MR. WICHSER: No, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Mr. Lammers?
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              MR. LAMMERS: No.
                                  Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Thank you for raising that issue.
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    We'll be in recess.
               (The foregoing sentencing was
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               concluded at 4:03 p.m.)
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                                 CERTIFICATE
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               I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
    from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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              s/ Shelly Semmler
                                                     7-10-09
          Shelly Semmler, RMR, CRR
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